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DO CONSUMERS REALLY REFUSE TO BUY
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD?*
Charles Noussair, St  ephane Robin and Bernard Rufﬁeux
Weelicitwillingness-to-payinformationforsimilarfoodproductsthatdifferonlyintheircontent
ofgeneticallymodiﬁedorganisms(GMOs).Participantsintheexperimentareademographically
representative sample of French consumers. 35% of participants are unwilling to purchase
products made with GMOs, 23% are indifferent or value the presence of GMOs, and 42% are
willingtopurchasethemiftheyaresufﬁcientlyinexpensive.Theresultscontrastwithsurveysthat
indicate overwhelming opposition to GM foods. There is a surplus to be gained from the segre-
gation of the market for food products into a GMO-free segment and a segment allowing GMOs.
The introduction of genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs) into food products
has ignited a passionate debate, particularly in Europe. On the basis of recom-
mendations from the scientiﬁc community, regulatory authorities such as the FSA
in the UK, the FDA in the US and the DGAL in France, have recognised that the
GMO products currently available are safe for the consumer and the environment.
Moreover, there is a consensus among scientists that biotechnology has the
potential to create products that will enhance nutrition, increase crop yields, and
reduce the use of toxic pesticides and herbicides. Nevertheless, polling of Euro-
pean consumers consistently indicates a high degree of hostility
1 to the presence of
GMOs in the food supply. The aversion to GMOs is based on both private con-
siderations, such as potential health risk and a preference for natural foods, as well
as social dimensions, such as environmental effects and ethical concerns. It
appears that the unfavourable view has been aggravated by the spread of the ‘mad
cow’ epidemic, the lack of beneﬁt that the ﬁrst generation of GMOs provides to
the consumer and the initial introduction of GMOs without the public’s know-
ledge. The tension between scientiﬁc recommendations and public opinion has
complicated the formulation of government policy with respect to GMOs,
2 because
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1 For example, Noussair et al. (2001) report that 79% of French respondents either agreed or mostly
agreed with the statement ‘GMOs should simply be banned’. 89% were opposed to the presence of
GMOs in food products, 89% in livestock feed, 86% in medicine, 46% in food packaging and 46% in
fuels. In the UK, surveys show a similar pattern (Moon and Balasubrimanian, 2001).
2 Any food product sold in the European Union for human consumption that contains an ingredient
that consists of more than 1% GMOs must be labelled ‘contains GMOs’. There is no GM produce
currently sold in Europe and the only GM products for sale appear as ingredients in processed foods.
Currently three types of corn are authorised for cultivation in France. One type of corn and one type of
soybean are authorised for importation. In the UK, in addition to corn and soybeans, one type of GM
tomato is authorised for importation and use in tomato puree. No GM crops are grown commercially in
the UK. In the US, as of early 2002, about two-dozen different GM fruits, vegetables, and grains were
being cultivated. In the US, there are no speciﬁc regulations for biotech products, which are subject to
the same regulations as other products. See Caswell (1998, 2000) for a discussion of policy issues
relating to the labelling of GM products.
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[ 102 ]in a democratic system public opinion must be taken into account in addition to
the scientiﬁc merits of the policy and the market pressures in the economy.
However, there is reason to question whether the anti-GMO sentiment ex-
pressed in surveys would be reﬂected in actual purchase behaviour. It is known
that individuals’ decisions can differ drastically between when they are hypothet-
ical, as in a contingent valuation study or other survey, and when they involve a real
commitment to purchase; see for example Neill et al. (1994); Cummings et al.
(1995); Brookshire and Coursey (1987); List and Shogren (1998); or List and
Gallet (2001). Furthermore, most surveys do not inquire about actual purchase
decisions at speciﬁc prices and, as Ajzen et al. (1996) note, subtle contextual cues
or small changes in information provided to survey respondents may change
results dramatically. More speciﬁc criticisms apply to surveys about preferences
over public goods, such as the preservation of GMO-free crops. Sagoff (1988),
Blamey et al. (1995) and Nyborg (2000) argue that survey and hypothetical con-
tingent valuation measurement techniques for public goods do not reveal partic-
ipants’ willingness-to-pay. Surveys place respondents in the role of citizens, who
make judgements from society’s point of view, rather than consumers, who make
actual purchase decisions. Thus the two instruments, surveys and purchase deci-
sions, measure different variables. In addition, even if provision or preservation of
a public good is valuable to an individual, it may not be reﬂected in his willingness-
to-pay because of the free rider problem (Stevens et al., 1991; Krutilla, 1967).
3
The focus of this paper is to consider, using experimental methods, the extent
that actual decisions to purchase food products are affected by the presence of
GMOs. We study purchasing behaviour of consumers with a laboratory experiment
designed to elicit and compare the willingness to pay for products that are tradi-
tional in content and labelling, that are explicitly guaranteed to be GMO-free and
that contain GMOs. We also consider buyer behaviour with respect to different
thresholds of maximum GMO content. The participants in our study are a
demographically representative sample of residents of the Grenoble, France area.
We use an experimental approach because of the absence of ﬁeld data. The
current policy of most major European retailers not to carry GM foods, which has
resulted from pressure of activists and the media, means that it is very difﬁcult to
estimate product demand for foods containing GMOs using ﬁeld data from
European countries. For the few GM products that are available, there is experi-
mental evidence that consumers are unaware of the labelling of GM content; see
Noussair et al. (2002). Furthermore, in the US, where the vast majority of GM food
is sold, demand for GMOs cannot be inferred from market data since GM content
is not indicated on the labelling. We are unaware of any previous estimates of
consumer demand for the GMO-free characteristic in food products. However,
previous work suggests that experiments provide a good alternative method to
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3 A well-documented example of a dichotomy between surveys and consumer behaviour was observed
during the introduction of recombinant bovine somatropin (rbST), a bovine growth hormone, into
milk production in the US in 1993. Surveys indicated that a majority of consumers had a negative
opinion of the technique, primarily on ethical grounds. On the basis of the survey data, analysts
predicted a 20% decline in total milk consumption. However, there was no decrease in actual milk
consumption after the introduction of the technique; see Aldrich and Blisard (1998).
 Royal Economic Society 2004study product demand in general, and that the artiﬁcial setting of the lab does not
drastically alter consumer behaviour.
4
1. Policy Issues: Segregation and Thresholds
In response to the tension between scientiﬁc and public opinion on the issue of
GM foods, the policy adopted by most European governments has been to declare
a moratorium on approval of new GM products for cultivation and sale. For the few
products that have already been approved, their policy has been to segregate GM
and GMO-free products at all stages of production, to require labelling of products
containing GMOs, and to allow the market to determine how much of each type of
product is sold. However, banning new GMOs may be inefﬁcient if there are
welfare gains from the adoption of biotechnology that are foregone. In addition,
although segregation and mandatory labelling is free-market-oriented
5 in that it
offers consumers a choice, some economists might view it also as an inefﬁcient
policy.
6 Segregating the entire process of production is costly to farmers and ﬁrms
throughout the production chain, especially in the upstream part of the chain,
which consists of the seed producers, farmers and primary processors.
7 Since there
is no evidence that the GMOs that regulatory authorities have approved are
harmful either to health or to the environment, it can be argued that the
expenditure represents a deadweight loss.
On the other hand, if the production tracks are not segregated or labelling of
GMO content is interdicted, as it is in the US, a ‘lemons’ scenario may result
(Akerlof, 1970). The GMOs currently on the market were introduced for agro-
nomic reasons and the foods containing them are indistinguishable from con-
ventional foods to the consumer in the absence of labelling information. Since
GMOs lower production costs, producers have an incentive to insert them into the
food supply. If consumers value foods containing GMOs less than foods that do
not contain GMOs, they will be unwilling to pay more for an unlabelled product
than an amount that reﬂects the presence of GMOs. This would cause the market
for non-GMO varieties to disappear, reducing social welfare by eliminating
potential gains from trade. Furthermore, it could potentially cause a market col-
lapse for entire products. If a ﬁrm cannot disclose that its product uses no
ingredients that contain GMOs, it might replace ingredients that consumers
4 See for example Shogren et al. (1999).
5 Romer (2001) notes that the institutions of science and the market are the main engines of
globalisation. However, in some cases, the consensus of the scientiﬁc community and market pressures
can clash with each other and with public opinion. The case of the ﬁrst generation of GMOs in food
products appears to constitute a prominent example of a situation where science, public opinion and
the market each exert pressure toward different outcomes. More generally, the current anti-globalisa-
tion movement might be interpreted as a backlash against market or scientiﬁc forces. The ‘loss of
sovereignty’ lamented by some anti-globalisation activists can be viewed as a decline in the ability of
public opinion to inﬂuence outcomes when confronted by market forces or the scientiﬁc establishment.
6 A few studies have estimated the gains from the adoption of biotechnology in farming in the US.
See for example Anderson et al. (2000), Lin et al. (2001), Falk-Zepeda et al. (2000), Traxler et al. (2000),
or Lence and Hayes (2001).
7 In the US, segregation costs have been estimated at 12% of the current price of corn and 11% of
the current price of soybeans (Economic Research Service/USDA, 2000). Buckwell et al. (1999) ﬁnd
that in general, identity preservation for speciality crops increases ﬁnal costs by 5–15%.
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eliminate the entire market for many products, such as soy lecithin, corn syrup,
and corn starch.
From an economist’s point of view, the appropriate policy depends in part on
whether the actual purchase behaviour of consumers corresponds to the polling
data. If, as suggested by the polls, a large majority of consumers are unwilling to
purchase products containing GMOs, banning GMOs is probably the best option,
as the expense of creating two tracks of production would not be justiﬁed. On
the other hand, if the vast majority of consumers behave as if they are indifferent
to GMOs, or would purchase products made with GMOs if they sold at lower
prices, the production tracks could be safely integrated with little social cost.
However, if a considerable segment of the market refuses to purchase products
containing GMOs at any price, but another large segment would purchase GM
products if they were cheaper, separation of the production tracks and the
enforcement of mandatory labelling of products containing GMOs would be
worth the expense.
Under a policy of segregation, the threshold level of GMO content, above
which a product is considered to be bioengineered, must be speciﬁed. Because of
the ease of contamination throughout the production chain, it is impossible
intentionally to make any product, in whose manufacture GMOs are already
authorised, without any trace of GMOs. This technological constraint requires
the speciﬁcation of a threshold above zero below which a product is to be con-
sidered as GMO-free and above which the product must be labelled as containing
GMOs. The lower the threshold, the greater is the cost of production of GMO-
free products. The increase involves the cost of producing very pure seeds, iso-
lating parcels of land, and cleaning storage and transportation containers. The
marginal cost of lowering the threshold may be justiﬁed if consumers have a
strong preference for a low threshold, as is suggested in surveys of public opin-
ion. In our experiment, in addition to studying the willingness to pay for GMO




The experiment is designed to study the extent that consumers value the absence
of GMOs in food products by measuring changes in willingness to pay in response
to new information about GMO content. The protocol we use is new to the lit-
erature and can be readily applied to study the marginal value of different char-
acteristics of many consumer goods. However, it is similar in spirit to several other
experimental protocols in the literature such as the nth price auction technique
used in Hoffman et al. (1993) and the CVX-M calibration method studied in Fox
et al. (1998). See Shogren (2004) for a survey of experimental techniques of
eliciting valuation information. Our protocol differs from many others that appear
in the literature in three principal ways.
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anism with auctions for goods with induced values.
(2) During the training phase, there is an interactive dialogue between the
subjects themselves.
(3) When bidding for the products of interest, we do not make the bids public
information at any time, so that privacy of valuations is safeguarded, no
peer pressure can be mobilised to encourage systematic boycotting of the
GMO products and subjects cannot use others’ bids to update their own
valuations.
In our experiment, subjects bid for real consumer goods using the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 1964). In the BDM, a type of auction,
bidders have a dominant strategy in bidding an amount equal to their true valua-
tions for the good. There are several advantages to using demand-revealing
mechanisms to elicit willingness-to-pay information and other authors have already
employed them to study potential consumer demandfor food productsbefore their
introduction; see for example Fox et al. (1998) or Hoffman et al. (1993). The ﬁrst
advantage is that unlike survey data, the auction provides a common homogeneous
unit, money, to measure preferences. Different respondents may interpret terms
‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ on a survey differently but the interpretation of £1 is
common to all respondents. The use of money as a metric allows for comparisons of
intensity of preferences between subjects, as well as between goods. Secondly, in the
auction, the subject is committing himself to an actual purchase, unlike in a poll
where there is no commitment. Thirdly, in a demand-revealing mechanism, there is
a dominant strategy to indicate one’s true valuation. In principle, this allows the
willingness-to-pay to be directly measured, rather than inferred. The existence of a
dominantstrategyalsosimpliﬁes calculationof aparticipant’s beststrategysince itis
independent of own risk attitudes and beliefs about other players. Fourthly, the bid
submittedin the auction weightseach characteristic of the product, including GMO
content, according to its importance for the purchase decision. Respondents to a
survey may express a very strong preference for GMO-free products. However, the
survey would not accurately reveal the weight the GMO-free characteristic carries
compared to other dimensions such as taste, appearance and price. As suggested
earlier, a survey might be expected to accord greater weight to public dimensions,
such as negative externalities that result from widespread use of the product, than a
bid in an auction market.
Two previous experiments have directly studied willingness-to-pay for GMOs.
Both employed subjects from the American Midwest, whose preferences on the GM
issue may diverge sharply from European consumers. Lusk et al. (2000) study the
decisions of American university students. They endow each subject with a bag of
genetically modiﬁed corn chips and allow him to bid for the right to exchange it for
a bag of non-genetically modiﬁed chips. Only 30% of subjects indicated a willing-
ness to pay a positive amount for the GMO-free product, and the willingness-to-pay
wasonaverage7centsperounce,with20%willing topayatleast20centsperounce.
Huffmanetal.(2001)investigatebiddingbehaviourforGMO-containingandGMO-
free typesofvegetableoil,tortilla chipsand Russetpotatoes ofasample ofAmerican
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which bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids and the n highest bidders each
receive a unit of the good. The winners each pay a price equal to the n + 1th highest
bid. The number n is chosen randomly after the bids are made. They found that for
all three goods, the average bidder had a lower willingness to pay for the GM variety.
The average premium for GMO-free food was 14%.
2.2. The Participants
The participants in our experiment were a demographically representative sample
of consumers in the Grenoble area. 97 subjects participated, each taking part in
exactly one of the ten sessions that comprised the experiment. The sessions took
place between July 17
thand 24
th, 2000. Each session took approximately two hours.
The ages of the subjects ranged between 18 and 75 years, and averaged 33 years.
52% were female. The socio-economic level of the sample was representative of the
French urban population.
Subjects were recruited by sampling from the telephone directory of the city of
Grenoble. The method of recruitment made it highly improbable that subjects
communicated with others who participated in an earlier session. Over 1,000
telephone calls were necessary to recruit the 97 who participated in the study.
Subjects were screened later in the recruiting process to make the sample more
demographically representative after early recruiting attracted a disproportionate
fraction of participants under age 25 and over age 60. At the time of recruitment,
subjects received no indication that the experiment concerned GMOs or potential
risks to the food supply. Subjects were invited to come to the laboratory to sample
food products for a government research project which was not linked to private
ﬁrms or marketing of any particular products. We invited only those respondents
who indicated both that they were regular purchasers of biscuits and that they
made purchase decisions for their household.
2.3. The BDM mechanism
We used the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness-to-
pay information.
8 In the BDM, there is a dominant strategy to bid one’s valuation.
In other words, it is a best response, no matter what strategy other players adopt,
and regardless of the risk attitude of the bidder, to bid truthfully an amount equal
to his willingness-to-pay. Therefore in principle, the mechanism has the ability to
reveal bidders’ valuations.
The rules of the BDM mechanism are simple. Each subject simultaneously
submits a bid to the experimenter in a closed envelope to purchase one unit of the
good offered for sale. The experimenter then randomly draws a sale price from a
8 Technically, the BDM procedure is not an auction, since agents are not competing with each other
for the items for sale. However, because of their parsimony, we will use the term ‘bid’ to refer to the
submission of a limit price and the term ‘the auction’ to refer to the process as a whole. The BDM
mechanism is theoretically equivalent to a second price sealed bid auction (Vickrey, 1961) where a
bidder bids against one demand-revealing opponent.
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willingness to pay among bidders. Any subject who submits a bid greater than the
sale price receives an item and pays an amount equal to the sale price. The others
do not receive units and make no payment.
2.4. The Training Phase
Though previous studies of the BDM mechanism have shown it to be incentive
compatible (Irwin et al., 1998),
9 we nevertheless included a training phase to
ensure that subjects learned to use the dominant strategy. This training proceeded
in the following manner. At the beginning of a session, each subject received 150
francs (roughly 23) in cash.
We started the training phase of each session with an auction of an actual
consumer product, a bottle of orange juice, whose label was visible and that was
previously tasted by the subjects. After bidding, all of the bids were posted, the sale
price was drawn, the winners were announced and the transactions were imple-
mented immediately. There are two reasons that we introduced this ﬁrst auction to
the training phase. The ﬁrst reason is that it made subjects aware that others’
valuations for goods can differ from their own. The second reason was to provide
an easier transition to the GMO phase of the experiment, where subjects would be
placed in a situation that is different in three ways from typical market purchases.
They buy products whose labels and packaging have been removed, taste products
without knowledge of the information displayed on the label, and buy products
without knowing the sale price beforehand. We believe it is better to make this leap
into the unknown in two steps, with the ﬁrst step being the auctioning of a product
with visible packaging and labelling, which subjects do not taste but whose sale
price is not known beforehand. This auction also serves to illustrate to subjects that
they are spending real money for real products that they can keep after the
experiment and that they are not in a simulation. To render this transparent, a
bottle of orange juice is given to each winner, who is required to immediately pay
the price determined by the auction from his current cash total.
Subjects then participated in several BDM auctions in which they bid for ﬁcti-
tious items. The ﬁctitious items had induced values; see Smith (1982) for an
exposition of induced value theory. Before the auction took place, each subject
received a sheet of paper that indicated an amount of money for which he could
redeem a unit of the ﬁctitious item from the experimenter, should he purchase it
in the auction. The induced value differed from subject to subject and was private
9 Rutstrom (1998) provides evidence that can be interpreted as suggesting that the BDM leads to bids
closer to true valuations than the Vickrey auction. The two auctions both have dominant strategies of
truthful bidding. However, the second price auction yields bids that are too high in induced value
auctions (Kagel et al., 1987). In auctions for a product with homegrown rather than induced value,
chocolate trufﬂes, Rutstrom ﬁnds that the BDM yields lower bids than the Vickrey auction, suggesting
that it may be the case that the bias toward high bidding is less severe in the BDM than in the Vickrey
auction. Bohm et al. (1997) point out that the BDM can fail to elicit true valuations when used to elicit
willingness to sell information, if the maximum sale price is inappropriately set. Here we do not face this
type of problem since we are eliciting willingness to pay information and we can specify the minimum
purchase price equal to zero.
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price in the auction, since a subject’s payoff if he won the auction equalled the
induced value minus the price he paid. The inclusion of the auctions with induced
values had three objectives: to teach the subjects and verify their comprehension of
the rules of the auction, to reduce the biases and noise that tend to arise in
bidding behaviour and to show subjects that the auction involved transactions
where real money was at stake.
The dominant strategy of bidding one’s valuation in the auctions is not at ﬁrst
obvious to most subjects. We chose not to inform the subjects directly of the
dominant strategy. Instead, we used a technique intended to encourage subjects to
come to understand the strategies that constitute optimal behaviour on their own.
After subjects submitted their bids, the experimenter drew a selling price, wrote all
of the valuations on the blackboard and asked subjects if they could identify their
own valuations and predict which subjects would be receiving units of the good
based on the valuations displayed. Then the experimenter recorded the submitted
bids on the blackboard next to the corresponding valuations. He posed the fol-
lowing questions to the group of subjects, who were free to engage in open dis-
cussion on the topics.
(a) Which subjects received units in the auction?
(b) How much did the winners pay?
(c) Did anyone regret the bid he submitted?
After the discussion, each of the winners received, in full view of all participants, an
amountofmoney equal to hisinduced value minus the price hewasrequiredto pay.
Thecashwasphysicallyplacedonthedesk infrontofthesubject aftertheauction.A
seriesofidenticalauctionswasconductedusingthesame procedure.Thevaluations
in each period were randomly drawn from a uniform distribution whose endpoints
differed in each period. The auctions continued until at least 80% of the bids were
within 5% of valuations. This occurred within 6 periods in all sessions.
2.5. The GMO Phase
In the GMO phase we simultaneously auctioned four products, which we referred
to as S, L, C and N during the sessions. All four products were biscuits that are
typically available in grocery stores and supermarkets throughout France, and we
informed subjects of that fact before bidding began. The products were different
from each other, but were close substitutes. The GMO phase of the experiment
consisted of ﬁve periods, as outlined in Table 1. At the beginning of this phase,
subjects received a sample of each of the four products to taste, without its pack-
aging or labelling. Before bidding in the ﬁrst period, subjects were required to
taste each product. They then marked down how much they liked the product on a
scale where ‘I like it very much’ and ‘I don’t like it at all’ were at the extremes of
the rating scale (see Combris et al., 1997).
10 Then the auction for period 1 took
10 Results on the relationship between ratings and bids for these, as well as other products are
reported in Noussair et al. (forthcoming).
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periods consisted of the revelation of some information about some or all of the
products, followed by a simultaneous auction for the four products. The sale price
was not drawn for any period until the end of period 5 and no information was
given to participants about other players’ bids.
Table 1 shows the information made available to subjects at the beginning of
each period.
11 At the beginning of period 2, we informed the subjects that product
S contained GMOs and that product N was GMO-free.
12 No information was given
about products L and C in period 2. At the beginning of period 3, we informed the
subjects that no ingredient in L contained more than 1% GMOs and that no
ingredient in C contained more than 1/10 of 1% GMOs. We also indicated to
subjects that no ingredient in N had any detectable trace of GM content, and that S
contained a GM ingredient, soy, that was authorised in France. At the beginning of
period 4, subjects received a four-page handout containing background informa-
tion about GMOs. The information consisted of
(a) the deﬁnition of a GMO,
(b) the criteria for classifying a product as containing GMOs
(c) the list of GM plants authorised in France
(d) the food products sold in France that contain GMOs, and
(e) the current French law regarding GMOs.
Table 1
Sequence of Events in GMO Phase of an Experimental Session
Period 1 – Information: blind tasting of the four products S, L, C and N
– Recording of hedonic rating of the four products
– Auction




– Additional Information: ‘No ingredient in L contains more than 1% GMOs’,
‘No ingredient in C contains more than 1/10 of 1% GMOs’, ‘One ingredient
in S (soy) is derived from an authorised genetically modiﬁed product’,
and ‘No ingredient in N contains any detectable trace of GMOs’
– Auction
– Additional Information: general information about GMOs
– Auction
Period 5 – Additional Information: the brand names of the four products and the
designation ‘organically grown’ for product N
– Auction
Transactions – Random draw of the auction that counts toward ﬁnal allocations
– Implementation of transactions for the period that counts
11 We do not reveal bids publicly during the GMO phase, because it is possible that other players’
bids might inﬂuence some individuals’ willingness to pay, when the good being sold has homegrown
rather than induced value. Also, in the GMO phase, we auction four goods simultaneously, whereas in
the training phase, only one good was auctioned at a time. We felt that confronting the subjects too
early in the session with bidding for multiple products simultaneously might have been overwhelming.
On the other hand, once they had mastered the rules of the auction for one item, subjects seemed to
have little difﬁculty with the multiple-good simultaneous auction.
12 See Fox et al. (2002) for another example of an experiment in which the impact of new infor-
mation of willingness-to-pay is studied.
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auction bids to favourable and unfavourable descriptions of the item sold. Before
the last period, we revealed the brands of the four products and the label indi-
cating that product N was organic.
3. Results
3.1. The Impact of GMO Information
Figure 1 graphs the evolution of the average normalised bid over all subjects
over the ﬁve periods of the GMO phase for the 4 products. The data in the
Figure are normalised by taking each individual’s actual bid in period 1 as the
base, set equal to 100, tracking that individual’s bids over time relative to his bid
in period 1 and averaging across all individuals in each period. Table 2 contains
the unnormalised averages and variances of bids in each period for each
product. The changes in individual bids between periods 1 and 3 are described
in Table 3. Only the data from those who bid greater than 0 for the product in
period 1 are included in Tables 2 and 3, as well as in Figure 1 (no subject who bid
zero in period one ever submitted a positive bid in later periods).
13 The column
entitled Percentage Bidding Zero indicates the percentage of subjects that bid 0
upon being informed of the product’s GMO content. In the column labelled
Percentage Decreasing Bid, the percentage of subjects that lower their bids for a
product, while continuing to bid more than zero, is indicated. The Percentage
Fig. 1. Average Bids for the Four Biscuits in Period 1–5
13 The number of subjects who bid zero in period 1 was 14 for products N and S, 13 for product L and
29 for product C.
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learning the GMO content. Percentage Increasing Bid is the percentage that increases
their bids.
Table 2













N GMO Free 15.29FF 16.47FF 16.95FF 17.47FF 17.57FF
(0.68) (0.72) (0.69) (0.69) (0.64)
[+8%**] [+3%**] [+3%**] [+1%]
{13} {15} {15} {15} {16}
C Threshold 0.1% 15.02FF 14.96FF 15.16FF 15.75FF 15.32FF
(0.65) (0.63) (0.69) (0.65) (0.66)
[0%] [+1%] [+4%**] [)3%**]
{12} {13} {13} {14} {13}
L Threshold 1% 15.48FF 15.30FF 13.91FF 13.95FF 14.65FF
(0.75) (0.64) (0.76) (0.75) (0.75)
[)1%] [)9%**] [0%] [+5%**]
{14} {15} {12} {12} {15}
S With GMOs 17.85FF 10.90FF 10.80FF 11.35FF 11.81FF
(0.69) (1.03) (0.96) (0.93) (0.91)
[)39%**] [)1%] [+5%**] [+4%**]
{15} {10} {10} {10} {10}
(variance), [increase from previous period], **average signiﬁcantly different at 1% level from previous
period according to pooled-variance t-test, {median}.
Table 3
Percentage Bidding Zero and Decreasing, Increasing, and Holding Constant Their
Bids after Learning GMO Content
Product
no. of subjects
















N GMO Free 83 subj. 0% 8.4% 42.2% 49.4%
(15.29FF) (18.30FF) (15.30FF) (14.79FF)
()5.4F) (–) (+3.32)
[)18.9%] [0%] [+22.4%]
C Threshold 0.1% 68 subj. 4.4% 23.5% 38.2% 33.8%
(15.02FF) (8.63FF) (18.71FF) (13.51FF) (14.99FF)
()8.63FF) ()3.86FF) (–) (+4.24)
[)100%] [)20.6%] [0%] [+28.3%]
L Threshold 1% 84 subj. 10.7% 31.0% 40.5% 17.9%
(15.48FF) (9.94FF) (19.02FF) (14.27FF) (17.90FF)
()9.94FF) ()3.98FF) (–) (+4.07FF)
[)100%] [)26.5%] [0%] [+20.9%]
S With GMOs 83 subj. 34.9% 42.2% 18.1% 4.8%
(17.85FF) (13.09FF) (22.37FF) (18.04FF) (12.13FF)
()13.09FF) ()6.34FF) (–) (+6.10FF)
[)100%] [)28.3%] [0%] [+50.3%]
(Average bid in French Francs for observations in category), (average absolute change in bid, in FF),
[average percentage change in bid, in FF].
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and that the ‘average’ consumer values the absence of GMOs. In period 2, we
revealed that product N did not contain GMOs and product S did contain GMOs.
The GMO-free guarantee raised the limit price for product N of the average
consumer in our sample by 8%. 41 of the 83 subjects, who bid more than zero for
product N in period one, raised their bid in period 2 and only 7 lowered it. A sign
test (eliminating the ties in which bids were the same in both periods) rejects the
hypothesis that a bidder is equally likely to lower as to raise his bid at the p < 0.001
level. A pooled variance t-test also rejects the hypothesis that the mean bid for
product N is equal in periods 1 and 2 at p < 0.01, indicating that the ‘average’
consumer increased his bid in period 2. In contrast, revealing that product S
contains GMOs lowered its average limit price by 39%. Only 4 participants in-
creased their bid for S after learning that it contained GMOs while 64 lowered
their bid. Both the sign test and the pooled variance t-test reject the hypothesis of
equality at the p < 0.001 level. The relatively small increase for the GMO-free
product suggests that in the absence of information, consumers typically act as if
there is a low probability that products contain GMOs. The average premium for
the GMO-free product over the product containing GMOs was 46.7%.
Our subjects appear to view a guarantee that no ingredient contains more than
0.1% GMOs as consistent with the typical GMO content of conventional products
(the unlabelled product historically available). They value a 0.1% guarantee more
highly than a 1% guarantee and the 1% threshold appears to be seen as a higher
level of GMO content than that of a conventional product. Furthermore, the 1%
guarantee was viewed differently from the label ‘contains GMOs’ and the 0.1%
guarantee was viewed differently from ‘GMO-free’. In period 3, we revealed that no
ingredient in product L contained more than 1% GMOs and no ingredient in
product C contained more than 0.1% GMOs. We observed no signiﬁcant change in
the median willingness to pay for product C between periods 2 and 3 (p ¼ 0.38 for
the sign test) but the average bid for product L declined by 10% and the decline
was statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.05 for the sign test). A pooled variance t-test of
the hypothesis that the mean normalised bids for products L and C are equal
rejects the hypothesis at a signiﬁcance level of p < 0.01. There was no consensus
among the participants about whether a product meeting the 0.1% threshold was
valued more or less highly than a conventional product. 33% increased their bid
(by an average of 28%) after learning the maximum possible GMO content was
0.1% of any ingredient, while 27.9% reduced their bid. 4.4% reduced their bid to
zero. The bidding behaviour for product L reveals that a product meeting a 1%
threshold is viewed very differently from a product labelled as containing GMOs.
17.9% of subjects increased their bid when informed of the 1% threshold, and
40.5% left their bid unchanged. Thus over half of our participants considered a
product satisfying the 1% threshold as no worse than the conventional product.
The 1% guarantee was viewed as different from the 0.1% guarantee. The mean
normalised bids in period 3 for products N and C, as well as for products L and S,
were signiﬁcantly different from each other at p < 0.01.
The distribution of background information about biotechnology in period 4
led to a slight increase in average limit prices, which was signiﬁcant at p < 0.05 for
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The information did not bring the prices of L, with a 1% threshold, or S, which
contained GMOs, to their levels before any information was revealed. For all four
products at least 57% of the bids were unchanged between periods 3 and 4. For
product N, the GMO-free product, 20 bidders increased their bid while 9 lowered
it and we can reject the hypothesis that an individual was equally likely to raise and
to lower his bid at the p < 0.05 level. However, we cannot reject the analogous
hypotheses for the other three products. Thus for each of the products, though
the pooled variance t-test indicates that the information increased the bid of the
‘average’ consumer, the more conservative sign test is not signiﬁcant and the
majority of participants did not change their bids.
Revealing the brand names of the products in period 5 raised the average prices
for three of the four products. The effect was signiﬁcant at p < 0.01 for L and S.
The average bid for product C was signiﬁcantly lower in period 5 than in period 4
at p < 0.01. However, for all four products, we fail to reject the hypothesis that an
equal number of bidders raised and lowered their bids in period 5 relative to
period 4. There was no increase in price for product N from revealing that it was
organically produced, perhaps because revealing its label exerted an offsetting
negative effect.
3.2. Bidder Types and Demographics
Our consumers can be classiﬁed into four categories. In classifying the participants
we consider only those who demonstrated a positive willingness to pay for product
S before it was revealed to contain GMOs. In other words, the classiﬁcation applies
only to those for whom b1(S) > 0, where bk(x) is the bid in period k for product x.
We refer to those consumers whose bids satisfy b1(S) > 0 and b2(S) ¼ 0, as
Unwilling consumers. Unwilling consumers bid zero for product S after learning
that it contained GMOs. They comprised 34.9% of our subjects. It is clear that they
have lowered their bids in period 2 because of the information about GMO con-
tent, because only 1 of the Unwilling also lowered his bid for product N in period 2
after ﬁnding out it was GMO-free. 14 of the Unwilling consumers submitted
b2(N) ¼ b1(N) and 13 submitted a bid satisfying b2(N)>b1(N), indicating at least a
weak preference for the GMO-free characteristic. However, the Unwilling were
disproportionately likely to have a low opportunity cost of not purchasing the
product, in that 1/3 of them bid less than 50% of the average bid in period 1. We
can also consider the percentage that bid zero for products L and C in period 3 in
response to the availability of the threshold information. Specifying a threshold
resulted in a lower incidence of zero bidding than the announcement ‘contains
GMOs’. 10.7% of the subjects bid zero for the product with a maximum of 1%
GMO content in any ingredient, and only 4.4% bid zero at 0.1%. That means that
over 95% of our participants were willing to accept a level of GMO content that
typically results from inadvertent co-mingling if the product is sufﬁciently inex-
pensive.
For 18.1% of our consumers, b2(S) ¼ b1(S). That is, they did not change their
bid for product S upon ﬁnding out that it contained GMOs. We classify them as
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goods. That is they set b2(S) ¼ b1(S), b2(N) ¼ b1(N), b3(L) ¼ b1(L) and
b3(C) ¼ b1(C). Another 4.9% of participants were Favourable, in that their choices
satisﬁed b2(S)>b1(S), demonstrating behaviour consistent with having a prefer-
ence for GM foods. However only 1 of the 4 Favourable consumers satisﬁed
b2(N)<b1(N) (whereas two submitted b2(N) ¼ b1(N) and one submitted
b2(N)>b1(N), suggesting possible confusion on his part about the decision situ-
ation), which is consistent with a negative value for the GMO-free characteristic.
Thus a full 23% of bidders were willing to accept GMOs in their food at the same
price as the conventional product. Despite the current unpopularity of GMOs in
food, there is still a group of consumers willing to buy them and to allow them to
establish a foothold in the marketplace.
42.2% of our subjects submitted bids that satisﬁed 0 < b2(S)<b1(S). They low-
ered their bid for product S but did not go so far as to bid zero. The average
percentage of the decrease was 28.3%. We call this group the Reluctant consumers.
This group places negative value on GMO content and will lower (raise) its bid
prices when faced with products with higher (lower) GMO content. They are
willing to trade off GMO content and the price they pay. 36.1% of the Reluctant
consumers also exhibited behaviour satisfying b3(S)/b1(S)<b3(L)/b1(L)<b3(C)/
b1(C)<b3(N)/b1(N). This indicates that their willingness to pay is monotonic in
the strength of the guarantee of the maximum GMO content.
We explore the relationship between acceptance of genetically modiﬁed
organisms and certain demographic characteristics of our subjects. We estimate
the following probit model:
Yi ¼ b0 þ b1 Gender þ b2 Age þ b3 Food-health þ b4 Diploma þ b5 1st cycle
þ b6 2nd cycle þ b7 3rd cycle
Yi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if consumer i is classiﬁed as Unwilling or
Reluctant, and equals 0 if the consumer is Favourable or Indifferent. Therefore Yi
can be interpreted as hostility to GMOs and a positive coefﬁcient on an
independent variable as a characteristic that is associated with a preference for
consuming foods that do not contain GMOs. The results of the analysis are given
in Table 4. The independent variable Gender equals 1 if the consumer is female and
zero if male. Age is given in years. Food-health equals 1 is the consumer works in the
food or health care industries, and therefore might be better informed about
GMOs than the average person. The other four variables are dummy variables that
indicate the highest level of education the individual has completed. Diploma
Table 4
Relationship between Aversion to GM-Food and Demographic Variables
Ind Var. Intercept Gender (female ¼ 1) Age Food-health Bac. 1stCycle 2ndCycle 3rdCycle
Coefﬁcient 1.113 0.068 )0.013 )0.055 0.345 )0.301 )0.200 0.560
(std. error) (0.577) (0.171) (0.015) (0.411) (0.391) (0.344) (0.317) (0.371)
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3rdcycle are increasing levels of university education, where 3rd cycle is roughly
equivalent to a Master’s degree. All educational variables equal zero for those who
have not completed their Baccalaureate. The probit estimates of the model,
given in Table 4, show that none of the variables is signiﬁcant. There is some
tendency for those with the highest level of education to demonstrate a stronger
preference for GMO-free products and weaker tendencies for younger people,
those who work in the food or health industry and for men to be more willing
to consume GM food. The individual level data reveal that the incidence of
Unwilling consumers is not highly dependent on demographics. 35% of men
and 34.9% of women were classiﬁed as Unwilling. Profession was not a good
predictor of refusal to purchase GMOs. For example, 33.3% of workers in ser-
vice industries, 33.3% of manual labourers, and 35.9% of students bid zero for
the product after ﬁnding out that it contained GMOs. The most pronounced
difference was between consumers with different educational levels. 20% of
those who had not completed a Diploma but 52.6% of 3rd Cycle graduates were
classiﬁed as Unwilling to purchase the GM product. In general, demographic
variables are not strongly related to bidding behaviour and our results are not
speciﬁc to certain demographic groups.
4. Discussion
Our results show a sharp contrast to the predominantly negative views of French
survey respondents toward genetically modiﬁed organisms in food products. In
our experiments, we observe a wide range of revealed preferences. Whereas 35%
of our subjects refused to purchase a product containing GMOs, the remaining
65% of our subjects were willing to purchase a GM product if it was sufﬁciently
inexpensive. Nearly one-quarter of participants showed no decrease in their will-
ingness to pay in response to learning that a product contained GMOs.
The two different thresholds, 0.1% and 1%, generated signiﬁcantly different
bids and were thus were clearly perceived as meaningfully different. Further-
more, the 0.1% threshold was not considered to be GMO-free and the 1%
threshold generated higher bids than the classiﬁcation ‘contains GMOs’. This
indicates that demand is decreasing in GMO content. 89% of our participants
were willing to purchase a product satisfying the 1% threshold, the maximum
content that the European Union exempts from labelling. Lowering the
threshold to 0.1% would make another 7% of participants willing to purchase
products satisfying the threshold, as 96% of our participants were willing to
purchase a product, in which no ingredient contained more than 0.1% GMOs,
if it were sufﬁciently inexpensive.
The price patterns we observe underscore the importance of GMOs to many
consumers. Changes in prices observed when GM content or thresholds were
revealed overwhelm those observed when brand names were revealed. The data
also indicate that revealing background information about GMOs had little
effect on the behaviour of our consumers. Their prior beliefs overwhelmed the
content of the information. This suggests that a public information campaign
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challenges.
One possible source of differences between the results from survey data and the
consumer behaviour observed in the experiment is a conﬁguration of private and
public dimensions of preference for GM food in which individuals are willing to
consume it but opposed to it in general. For example, this might be the case if
GMOs were viewed as carrying an environmental risk but also as safe for human
consumption. A consumer’s market behaviour would neglect the externality his
consumption imposes, whereas his response to a survey would not. This is anal-
ogous to the consumer of electricity who is opposed to nuclear power but uses the
electricity from the power grid, despite the fact that some of the electricity is
generated with nuclear power. This effect is consistent with negative responses to
the question ‘are you in favour of the use of GM ingredients in food?’ or ‘are you
in favour of the cultivation of GM crops?’ combined with a willingness to consume
GM food. However, there are also differences between surveys and the experi-
mental results that are inconsistent with this interpretation. For example, the
Noussair et al. (2001) survey, conducted in the Grenoble area with a sample of
participants with similar demographics as those in our study, asked speciﬁcally
‘would you buy [the product] if it contained GMOs?’ 91.7% responded negatively
for French fries, and 91.7% did so for tomatoes.
14 Therefore, there does appear to
be a major difference in the results of hypothetical surveys and consumer beha-
viour, even when the questions posed ask directly about the consumption decision.
The policy options available to address the arrival of biotechnology in food
production can be grouped into three types. The ﬁrst option is to ban the use of
GMOs in food products. The second is to integrate conventional and biotech
varieties into one production stream. The third is to create two production tracks
and introduce a labelling system (which could be voluntary or mandatory) to allow
the consumer to identify the two varieties. Based merely on polls, we would have
concluded that the only policy action that would be feasible in France given cur-
rent public opinion would be the complete interdiction of GMOs in food, or at
least a temporary moratorium on their use. However, our results indicate that only
slightly more than a third of the population would be unwilling to purchase
GMOs. The remainder is willing to purchase GMOs even when no threshold is
speciﬁed and could receive a welfare gain if GMOs make products cheaper. The
data thus argue against the banning of GMOs, which would cause gains from trade
to be foregone.
The data also reveal potential welfare costs to consumers from integrating the
two production streams. The consumers who are willing to purchase GMOs if they
are sold at a discount might be made better off. However, the segment that refuses
to purchase GM-products at any price (35% of participants in our sample) would
14 Surveys that ask speciﬁcally about consumption decisions also indicate that some of the opposition
to GMOs is based on concerns about personal consumption of GMOs. A poll conducted by Market and
Opinion Research International in 1999 found that 77% of French consumers agreed with the state-
ment ‘I would be unhappy to eat GM foods’. In a Sunday Independent poll of consumers in the UK in
early 1999, 68% indicated that they were ‘fearful of eating GM foods’. An ABC News poll conducted in
June 2001 found that 52% of Americans believed that GM foods were not safe to eat.
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ingredients that have no GM varieties.
In our view, our results weigh in favour of segmenting the market between
products containing GMOs and products that are GMO-free. In this way, the
Unwilling consumers could be assured of GMO-free varieties, while price sensitive
consumers could beneﬁt from the cost reductions that the ﬁrst generation of
GMOs provides. As long as the segregation costs are not greater than the welfare
gains from market segmentation, the sizes of each of the markets appear to justify
the establishment of two separate production tracks. The separation and labelling
policy gives the market the role of transmitting information about the safety of GM
products, by providing an opportunity and an incentive for consumers to sample
the lower cost products made with GMOs voluntarily. Our data indicate that a large
fraction of consumers would do so.
We conclude with some thoughts about the future of GM foods in Europe.
Following the framework of Nelson (1970) and Darby and Karni (1973) we can
divide the characteristics of a product into three groups. A search characteristic is a
property, such as colour or shape, which the buyer can identify before purchase.
An experience characteristic, such as taste, is only identiﬁed at the time the
product is consumed and a credence characteristic, such as nutritional value or
chemical content, can never be identiﬁed, other than from information provided
by a third party. Under a mandatory labelling system, the GMO content of a
product is a search characteristic for products labelled ‘containing GMOs’ and a
credence characteristic for an unlabelled product. During the introduction of GM
foods on the market, their safety and their equivalence to conventional products
are also credence characteristics.
We believe that the experience of the segment of the market that purchased
and consumed GM products would in time convince a greater percentage of
consumers of the safety of GMOs and of the equivalence of products containing
GMOs with conventional products. Safety and equivalence would become
experience characteristics rather than credence characteristics. If this occurs, the
threshold issue would become irrelevant in the long run. This argues for a fairly
loose standard of what can be considered GMO-free that is not very costly to
meet (such as 1% of any ingredient). Though the actual level of GMO content
in a ‘GMO-free’ product would remain a credence characteristic, who would
care?
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